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ABSTRACT
Companies continue to fold up after the global economic melt-down of 2008 starting with the Enron saga. One of the 
reasons offered by practitioners and intellectuals in their search for the cause and solution to the problem is information 
asymmetry between the managements and the shareholders. It is extremely necessary ever since the sagas and continuous 
business failures and financial distress in Nigeria, in particular, to focus on monitoring mechanisms (MM), especially in 
Sub-Saharan countries. In addition, it is essential to understand the factors relating to MM as it cannot work in isolation. 
The purpose of this study is therefore to examine the extent to which block-holders impact on MM using the annual 
reports of 111 Nigerian non-financial listed companies in the context of agency theory. In addition, data were collected 
from the companies in respect of their internal auditing using the questionnaire as these are not available in the annual 
reports. The findings provide evidence that the block-holders significantly relate to monitoring mechanisms. Thus, this 
paper provides a new knowledge regarding monitoring mechanisms and its antecedents (directorship, internal and 
external auditing). These findings are with policy implications for the board of directors to implement their monitoring 
responsibilities. The findings also suggest policy implications for the internal and external auditors. The findings are 
useful for further review of corporate governance guidelines by the regulatory agencies and government. The paper 
contributes to knowledge in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria in particular by examining block-holders in relation to the 
aggregate cost of monitoring mechanisms (directorship, internal and external auditing).
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INTRODUCTION
Stockholders find it more necessary than ever before to 
monitor the activities of their agents in managing the 
resources of the companies with their investments to 
ensure that their interests are well protected. The incessant 
business failures following the global economic meltdown 
of 2008 involving Enron saga necessitates this desire 
(Al-Janadi, Rahman & Omar 2013). The relationship 
between these two parties is characterized by information 
asymmetry, expropriation of company’s assets by the 
management and controlling shareholders (Freeman 1994) 
and failure in corporate governance practices (Ikpefan & 
Ojeka 2013). Agency theory explains the problems that 
exist between the principal and the agents (Fama & Jensen 
1983). The means by which the shareholders monitor 
their agents is known as monitoring mechanisms (Huson, 
Parrino & Starks 2001). 
 Many countries have developed and reviewed 
their codes of corporate governance in their efforts 
to reduce information asymmetry stemming from 
corruption and fraud. The continuous review of codes of 
corporate governance and accumulating extant literature 
notwithstanding, global and national economy keep 
experiencing business failures occasioning corporate 
mergers, bankruptcies, collapses, inadequate disclosure 
in financial reports and loss of shareholders’ trusts and 
confidence (Akinbuli & Kelilume 2013; Cadbury 1992; 
Fodio, Ibikunle & Oba 2013; Waweru 2014). All these 
transform to increased unemployment, bad roads and 
transportation, currency depreciation, substantial reduction 
in stock values, poor education, increased criminality and 
corruption, child abuse, poor education, severe poverty, 
power failures, poor health facilities, insecurity and 
declining income (Adebayo & Adetayo 2014; Habbash 
2012; Hylton 2011). These are evidence that companies 
have not adequately addressed corruption and monitoring 
mechanisms (MM) are needed to reduce its practice and 
effects in their businesses. There is, therefore, an urgent 
need for more examination of corporate MM in Nigeria.
 Though, there are many studies on monitoring 
mechanisms (MM), most of the studies are from developed 
and transiting countries like U.S, U.K, and Malaysia 
(Mohamad-Nor, Shafie & Wan-Hussin 2010; Mustapha & 
Che-Ahmad 2009; Liu, Uchida & Yang 2012; Banerjee, 
Couzoff & Pawlina 2012). Also, many of the studies do 
not address the aggregate MM (summation of directorship, 
internal and external auditing), but one or two of its 
dimensions. In addition, to the best of the knowledge of the 
researchers, only two of the extant literature treated total 
MM in their studies (Anderson, Francis & Stokes 1993; 
Mustapha & Che-Ahmad 2009).
 There is a drought of literature on monitoring 
mechanisms (MM) in Sub-Saharan Africa with particular 
reference to Nigeria. There are few studies on external 
auditing (Adeyemi & Fagbemi 2010; Ogiedu & Izedonmi 
2013), internal and external auditing (Zare, Khedri & 
72 
Farzanfar 2013) and directorship (Uadiale 2010) in 
Nigeria. None of the researchers addressed the total MM 
(directorship, internal and external auditing) in their 
studies, to the best of the knowledge of the researchers.
 The dramatic business failures, bankruptcy, and 
drops in stock values this past decade resulting from weak 
monitoring mechanisms (MM) problem of enforcing the 
code of corporate governance have been of great concern 
(Babatunde & Olaniran 2009; Enofe, Mgbame, Aronmwan 
& Ogbeide 2013) in Nigeria. The concern for the present 
state of Nigerian economy irrespective of the revised code 
of corporate governance has motivated this study. Other 
motivations for this study are the dearth of literature on 
aggregate MM in Nigeria. 
 Extant literature suggests that companies with block-
holders are likely to have less owner-manager conflicts 
(Habbash 2012; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad 2013) having 
great incentives to invest on monitoring the management 
(Arowolo & Che-Ahmad 2015; Hope 2013). Though, 
there is no specific directive in the code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria, investors and companies that know 
the significance of block-holding on agency conflicts 
encourage institutions and individuals to acquire large 
stocks. Two types of block-holding in Nigeria are the 
institutional and individual block-holding. However, 
block-holding is more of institutional than individuals in 
Nigeria. About 92% of the respondent companies in this 
study are with institutional block-holders while only about 
37% are with individual block-holders. The research on 
block-holders in Nigeria is scanty and none of it relates to 
aggregate monitoring mechanisms.
 This paper, therefore, empirically tests the relationship 
between the block-holders and monitoring mechanisms 
(directorship, internal and external auditing) in Nigerian 
non-financial listed companies. To the best of the 
knowledge of the researchers, this is the first study to 
investigate the relationship between block-holders and 
aggregate monitoring mechanisms, particularly in Nigeria. 
It is also the first study to examine total monitoring 
mechanisms (costs of directorship, internal and external 
auditing) in Sub-Saharan African, especially in Nigeria. 
Next to this section is literature review followed by 
hypotheses development, sections for discussion on 
methodology, result and conclusion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined the theory of the 
firm. It documents that agency theory is concerned with 
contract relationships involving a person(s) known as the 
principal and the other person refers to as the agent who 
the principal engages to act on his behalf. The theory 
recognizes that the two parties to the contract are utility 
maximizers; therefore, there will be a conflict of interests. 
The theory, therefore, suggests that the principal incurs 
monitoring costs to align the interests of both parties. 
This study, therefore, used agency theory to explain 
the relationship between block-holders and monitoring 
mechanisms because it is designed to resolve agency 
problems, which is the main basis of monitoring (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976). 
 Monitoring mechanisms (MM) mean different things to 
different people (Azim 2012; Kao 2002; Shleifer & Vishny 
1997). However, the different definitions notwithstanding, 
the objective remains the same. The objective is to resolve 
agency problems using MM to mitigate agency costs arising 
from the conflicts between the interests of the management 
and the shareholders (Azim 2012; Kao 2002) and inducing 
management to uphold the interests of the shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997).
 The study of Al-Janadi et al. (2013) is on corporate 
governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia. The study defines monitoring mechanisms (MM) as 
a means of providing adequate and sufficient information 
to the users of financial statements and protecting the 
interests of the shareholders. Bachlechner, Thalmann, 
and Manhart (2014), examines auditing service providers 
as related to cross-organizational settings using face-to-
face and 14 telephone interviews. The study defines MM 
as a means of identifying and satisfying the information 
needs of the principal by making sure that adequate 
controls are in place. The study of Banerjee et al. (2012), 
examines external monitoring, managerial entrenchment 
and corporate cash holdings in the US. It defines MM as 
tools to effectively reduce the proportion of privileges that 
management can extract at the detriment of shareholders’ 
value. Babatunde and Olaniran (2009), investigates the 
effects of internal and external mechanisms of governance 
and company performance in Nigeria. The study defines 
MM as the governance tools companies employ to 
prevent managers from activities not ideal for optimizing 
shareholders’ values. The study of Pizzini, Lin, Vargus, and 
Ziegenfuss (2011), examines the quality of internal audit 
function and its contribution on audit delays. It defines 
MM as the process of preventing material weaknesses in 
internal control and financial reporting.
 The economy of a nation is mostly the function of the 
performance of the companies operating in the country as 
they operate in the sectors of its economy and contributes 
to its gross domestic products (GDP), hence corporate 
MM is of great concern to governments, practitioners 
and academicians. Codes of corporate governance are 
therefore continually reviewed by various governments 
and organizations (Huson et al. 2001).
 Academicians have examined many issues relating 
to MM and corporate governance (Amran & Che-Ahmad 
2013; Banerjee et al. 2012; Chang 2015; Fodio et al.  2013; 
Liu et al. 2012; Mustapha & Che-Ahmad 2009; Mohamad-
Nor et al. 2010). Some are just on directorship MM only 
(Gamba & Goldstein 2009; Latif, Kamardin, Nisham, 
Mohd & Adam 2013). Some others are just on internal 
auditing only (Moorthy, Seetharaman, Mohamed, Gopalan 
& San 2011; Soh & Martinov-Bennie 2011). Some others 
are just on external auditing only (Bachlechner et al. 2014; 
Chow 2012). Very few combine directorship and internal 
auditing or directorship and external auditing while few 
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others combine internal and external auditing (Chen & 
Zhou 2007; Sarens, De Beelde & Everaert 2009; Pizzini 
et al. 2011). 
 In Nigeria, the activities of companies are guided 
by Company and Allied Act 1990 and 2004 as amended, 
standards (auditing, accounting and ethics), code of 
corporate governance 2011 SEC and other best practices 
(Appah & Emeh 2013). However, there are regulatory 
bodies to enforce and monitor compliance with these laws 
and standards, the provisions are inconsistent (World Bank 
2004) and overlap (NASB 2010). It was expected that the 
passage of Financial Reporting Council (FRC) bill of 2011 
and the revised code of corporate governance, SEC 2011 
will help to eliminate the inconsistencies.
 In the light of the various definition in the extant 
literature on monitoring mechanisms (MM) and weak 
corporate governance in Nigeria, this study examines 
the relationship between the block-holders and MM 
(directorship, internal and external auditing).
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
BLOCK-HOLDERS
Azim (2012), investigates the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms and their impact on company 
performance. The researcher documents that control 
by shareholders is weak where company ownership is 
dispersed. The study also suggests that concentration 
of ownership create room for block-holders to monitor 
and reduce the opportunistic attitude of management. It 
claims that block-holders determine how power could be 
distributed between the management and the shareholders 
with proxy contests and direct concession with the 
management. The study of Habbash (2012), examines 
earnings management, the effectiveness of audit committee 
and block-holders using 350 large firms in the UK. It 
claims that agency problems are less in companies with 
high block-holders because ownership is separated from 
management. However, it further claims that the agency 
problems shift from management-shareholders’ conflict 
of interests to majority-minority shareholders’ conflict 
of interests especially if the block-holder is managerial 
or family owner. It also documents that the presence of 
high block-holders moderates the effectiveness of audit 
committee’s monitoring roles, suggesting a reduction 
in the independence of the board of directors and audit 
committee. Block-holders are into different categories 
(Azim 2012). In this study, two categories of block-holders 
are examined as follows:
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK-HOLDERS
Agency theory suggests that institutional block-holders 
can reduce the opportunistic attitudes of the management. 
Extant literature has shown that institutional block-holders 
demand more monitoring the more their shareholding 
increases (Kao 2002; Liu 2012; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; 
Waweru 2014). Kao (2002), examines agency problems, 
firm performance and monitoring mechanisms in Taiwan. 
The study provides evidence that institutional block-
holders effectively reduce agency problems. The study of 
Liu (2012), investigates board monitoring, management 
contracting and earnings management. It finds that 
institutional block-holders with long-term orientations 
help to alleviate earnings management. Liu et al. (2012), 
examine how corporate governance relates to firm 
value during the global financial crisis. The study finds 
that institutional block-shareholders restrain financial 
constraints and expropriation problems. The study of 
Omri, Becuwe, and Mathe (2014), examines the effect of 
board composition on ownership structure and innovative 
behaviour in Tunisia. It documents that institutional 
block-holders positively correlate to the proportion of 
outside directors on the board of directors. It also provides 
evidence that institutional block-holders significantly 
relate to independent directors and innovative behaviour 
of the manager.
 The expectation, therefore, is that institutional block-
holders will uphold board independence as there will be 
more non-executive or independent directors on the board 
of directors. Also, institutional block-holders will demand 
more monitoring to protect their interests because (1) of 
the size of their shares, (2) they are with varied interests 
and schemes in their various security investments, and 
(3) they also have more information about the company. 
Institutional block-holders’ demand for more monitoring 
will help to align the interests of the management with 
the interests of the shareholders and reduce or eliminate 
agency problems. More costs will be incurred to implement 
adequate monitoring. This study, therefore, predicts that:
H1a: Institutional block-holders positively influence the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, 
internal and external auditing).
H1ai: Institutional block-holders positively influence the 
demand for directorship as a monitoring mechanism
H1aii: Institutional block-holders positively influence 
the demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism.
H1aiii: Institutional block-holders positively influence the 
demand for external auditing monitoring mechanism.
INDIVIDUAL BLOCK-HOLDERS
Most of the extant literature either ignore or lump the 
individual block-holders with the institutional block-
holders despite the difference between the two (Connelly, 
Hoskisson, Tihanyi & Certo 2010). Connelly et al. (2010) 
further claim that individual block-holders are treated as 
insider owners like CEOs, families and related parties. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), investigate how corporate 
governance structure relates to the performance of 
listed companies in Malaysia. The study documents that 
individual block-shareholders are often CEOs or related 
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parties to top management or family owners. It also claims 
that the controlling block-holders may expropriate the 
assets of the company, expose the company to risks that 
may damage the performance of the company. The study of 
Ali and Lesage (2013), examines the relationship between 
the nature of controlling shareholders and audit pricing in 
France. Its findings conform to the findings of Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) that individual block-holders are motivated 
to expropriate company assets. The study of Eng and Mak 
(2003), examines corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure. It concludes that individual block-holders are 
not related to the level of disclosure.
 Based on the above discussion, there may be no 
separation between ownership and control as demanded 
by agency theory for corporate governance. However, 
this study wishes to differ in its investigation. Individual 
block-holders are not necessarily insider owners like 
managerial ownership. They could be outside owners like 
foreign investors or any other outside ownership. The data 
collected for the study does not portray inside ownership as 
the names of the block-holders used are not found on the 
list of management staff. The study, therefore, considers 
outside individual block-holders. It is, therefore, expected 
that though their demand may not be as strong as the 
institutional block-holders as they cannot be as influential 
as the institutional block-holders, they will demand to 
monitor the management considering the size of their 
shares in the company. Therefore, this study predicts that:
H2a: Individual block-holders positively influence the 
demand for monitoring mechanisms (directorship, 
internal and external auditing).
H2ai:  Individual block-holders positively influence the 
demand for directorship as a monitoring mechanism
H2aii:  Individual block-holders positively influence 
the demand for internal auditing as a monitoring 
mechanism.
H2aiii: Individual block-holders positively influence the 
demand for external auditing monitoring mechanism.
METHODOLOGY
SAMPLE
The sample includes 111 non-financial companies listed 
in Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). Data were extracted 
from annual reports for years 2010 to 2012 and some 
others collected through questionnaires. The annual 
reports are with no information on the costs of internal 
auditing. Hence, data on the costs of internal auditing were 
collected using questionnaires. The researchers analysed 
111 questionnaires out of the 117 collected because there 
were no corresponding annual reports for 6 of them. 
The custodians (company internal auditors, accountants, 
and secretaries) of financial reports were chosen as the 
respondents for questionnaires to guarantee the integrity 
of the data.
 The researchers chose to use data for years 2010 to 
2012 because the revised code of corporate governance was 
approved in 2011. The researchers could have used data 
for five or more years but it is difficult to collect financial 
data like costs of internal auditing for so many years using 
questionnaires in Nigeria.
MEASUREMENT
Dependent Variable   The dependent variable in this study 
is the aggregate monitoring mechanisms. It is a construct 
based on three dimensions (directorship, internal and 
external auditing). It is measured as the total costs of 
the three dimensions. It is the remuneration of the non-
executive directors added to the costs of internal auditing 
and external auditor’s fees. The three dimensions were 
chosen as a replication of the study of Anderson et al. 
(1993) since this paper is an extension of the study of 
Anderson et al. (1993) and Mustapha and Che-Ahmad 
(2009).
Independent Variables   The independent variables in this 
study are the institutional and individual block-holders. The 
institutional block-holders measured as a variable is the 
proportion of the shareholdings of the institutional block 
shareholders to the issued share capital of the company. 
Individual block-holders as a variable is measured as a 
proportion of the shareholdings of the individual block 
shareholders to the issued share capital of the company.
Control Variables    The control variables in this study 
include industry and complexity. The industry is 
binary coded as 1 for manufacturing and 0 for services. 
Complexity is measured by the number of subsidiary 
companies.
Panel Data Models   The model for this study is as shown 
below:
 MCit = αit + β1INSBit + β2INDBit + β3INDit + 
   β4CCit + μit + εit    
Where:
MC = Monitoring Cost
INSB = Institutional Block-holders
INDB = Individual Block-holders
IND = Industry
CC = Complexity
RESULTS
In this study, the researchers did data cleaning, tested 
for respondent bias, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation and normality. All tests suggest that the 
model meets the minimum requirement for multivariate 
analysis. The F-test for the model is also statistically 
significant (p<0.0000). The r2 of the regression is 42.43% 
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suggesting that the model explains 42.43% contribution 
by the block-holders to the variations in the demand for 
monitoring mechanisms (MM). It also suggests that there 
are some other variables to explain the remaining 57.57% 
indicating more need for research. Likewise, it indicates 
that the relationships in the model are linear. 
 Table 1 shows that the mean value of the dependent 
variable, MM is N58.13 m while those of the independent 
variables, institutional block-holders (INSB), and individual 
block-holders (INDB) are 47.41% and 8.44% respectively. 
The standard deviation for MM is N75.66 m, while those 
of INSB and INDB are 27.38% and 15.80%. The minimum 
score for MMs is N11.66 m while those of INSB and INDB 
are 0 because some companies are with no information 
on block-holders. Their maximum scores are 609.50 m, 
97.35% and 87% respectively. 
 The results on collinearity, multicollinearity, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance of the study are shown 
in Tables 2 and 3. The variables in this study are free from 
collinearity and multicollinearity as all the values are less 
than 0.9, the VIF is 1.01, which is below the threshold of 
5 and tolerance are more than 0.2.
 The study examines the relationship between block-
holders and monitoring mechanisms (directorship, 
internal and external auditing) in Nigerian non-financial 
listed companies. The researchers decided to use panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) regression for the 
direct relationship between the organizational attributes, 
institutional and individual block-holders and monitoring 
mechanisms. PCSEs regression is robust in nature (Beck & 
Katz 1995) and capable of correcting heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation (Bailey & Katz 2011). 
 Table 4 presents results of the regressions ran using Stata 
12 and the linear equation. The results show a significant 
positive relationship between the Institutional block-holders 
and total monitoring mechanisms (MM) at 1% confidence 
level (β = 0.156, z = 2.39) as well as internal auditing 
(β = 0.052, z = 10.13) and external auditing (β = 0.192, 
z = 5.02) but significantly negative between institutional 
block-holders and directorship (β = 0.088, 2.92). Individual 
block-holders have a significant negative relationship with 
MM (β = 0.364, z = 8.03) and its dimensions [directorship 
(β = 0.278, 4.54), and external auditing (β = 0.097, z = 7.71) 
at 1% confidence level but have no significant but positive 
relationship with the internal auditing (β = 0.011, z = 0.72). 
Control variables, industry and complexity, are each with a 
significant positive relationship with MM and all the three 
dimensions, directorship, internal and external auditing.
 The findings of this study are consistent with the 
studies of Mustapha and Che-Ahmad (2013), Omri et al. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
MM
INSB
INDB
IND
CC
58.13
47.41
8.44
0.88
3.54
37.24
50.3
0.00
1.00
2.00
75.66
27.38
15.80
0.32
3.96
11.66
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
609.48
97.35
87.00
1.00
31.00
Note: MM = monitoring mechanisms; INSB = institutional block-holders; INDB = individual block-holders; 
IND = industry; CC = company complexity
TABLE 2. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Institutional Block-holders
Individual Block-holders
Industry
Complexity
Mean VIF
1.40
1.42
1.04
1.04
1.23
0.713
0.704
0.959
0.966
 
TABLE 3. Pearson correlation
Variables Monitoring 
Mechanisms
Institutional 
Block-holders
Individual 
Block-holders
Industry Complexity
Monitoring Mechanisms
Institutional Block-holders
Individual Block-holders
Industry
Complexity
1.000
0.008
-0.131
0.093
0.637
1.000
-0.513
0.091
-0.144
1.000
-0.203
-0.023
1.000
0.024 1.000
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(2014), Saleh, Rahman and Hassan (2009). A company 
with institutional block-holders is likely to demand more 
monitoring mechanisms to protect their interests. It also 
matches the suggestion of agency theory that institutional 
block-holders can help to reduce the opportunistic attitudes 
of management because they are likely to demand more 
monitoring. The institutional block-holders in many of 
the companies in Nigeria are foreign owners, government, 
and banks. The more their shares increase, the more 
their demand for monitoring. Hence, institutional block-
holders positively and significantly influence monitoring 
mechanisms.
 This study expects that individual block-holders in 
consistency with agency theory as outsiders, will provide 
the incentive for thorough monitoring of the management 
and enhance company performance and demand for more 
monitoring to align the interests of the management and 
shareholders. However, the results of this study deviate 
from this. It implies that the individual block-holders 
in the companies investigated are likely affiliated with 
the top management. Though they have the incentive to 
monitor, their relationship with top management may 
serve as a deterrent to acting as outsiders. Their roles shift 
therefore from being outsiders to insiders (related parties). 
Agency theory suggests that inside ownership helps to 
converge management and shareholder’s interests. Hence, 
they may not demand for monitoring. Added to this is 
the peculiarity of the Nigerian individual block-holders’ 
ignorance regarding their rights and roles they can play 
to reduce agency conflicts. The findings on individual 
block-holders are consistent with the study of Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) and agency theory for inside ownership. 
It also matches the study of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
that individual block-holders are often few and are less 
informed compared to the institutional block-holders. 
They lack enough information to exercise their control 
rights. They are not fascinated to participate in or learn 
about the governance of the company. The result also 
validates the fact that an individual block-shareholder 
lacks sufficient votes to personally control a company’s 
activities or management or board (Bennedsen & 
Wolfenzon 2000). Hence, the association of shareholders 
is emerging in many countries, Nigeria inclusive. There 
are few individual block-holders in Nigeria and may not 
be powerful enough to exercise their rights and ensure 
adequate monitoring of the management.
TABLE 4. Panel-corrected regression
Variables Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
Monitoring Mechanisms
Institutional Block-holders 0.156 0.065 2.39 0.017
Individual Block-holders -0.364 0.045 -8.03 0.000
Industry 13.400 2.245 5.96 0.000
Complexity 12.300 0.516 23.77 0.000
_cons -1.478 2.432 -0.61 0.543
Directorship
Institutional Block-holders -0.088 0.030 -2.92 0.003
Individual Block-holders -0.279 0.061 -4.54 0.000
Industry 3.741 0.999 3.74 0.000
Complexity 7.915 0.494 16.01 0.000
_cons -1.809 2.055 -0.88 0.379
Internal Auditing
Institutional Block-holders 0.052 0.005 10.13 0.000
Individual Block-holders 0.011 0.016 0.72 0.473
Industry 2.982 0.372 8.02 0.000
Complexity 0.353 0.024 14.72 0.000
_cons 12.200 0.654 18.62 0.000
External Auditing
Institutional Block-holders 0.192 0.038 5.02 0.000
Individual Block-holders -0.097 0.013 -7.71 0.000
Industry 6.666 1.009 6.61 0.000
Complexity 3.998 0.576 6.95 0.000
_cons -11.800 2.765 -4.29 0.000
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CONCLUSION
This study investigates the relationships between block-
holders and monitoring mechanisms (MM) in Nigerian 
non-financial listed companies in the context of agency 
theory. The motivation of the study is found in the 
prevalent corruption despite the existence of good laws, 
regulations, policies, and the recent approval of codes of 
corporate governance meant to ensure good corporate 
governance in companies. The primary contributions 
of this paper in consistency with agency theory are that 
block-holders significantly affect MM. Likewise, the 
control variables, industry and complexity significantly 
relate to MM. In additon, this paper contributes to 
knowledge by combining the three dimensions of MM 
in a study in Sub-Saharan region. The study adds to the 
literature on block shareholding, agency conflicts, and 
MM in Nigeria. 
 These findings are of importance to the investors, 
auditors, board of directors and also government and 
the regulatory agents regarding minority shareholders’ 
protection. Many Nigerian shareholders including 
individual block-holders are ignorant of their rights and 
the roles they can play in reducing agency conflicts in 
companies with their investments. The revised code of 
corporate governance, 2011 SEC mandates all shareholders, 
especially the block-holders to seek to positively influence 
the standard of the corporate governance of the companies 
where they invested. This study is limited to non-financial 
listed companies. Financial listed companies may be 
considered for future studies.
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